BitGo proves the key was safe. Hive proves the decision was allowed. Those are two different jobs, and only one of them has ever had proof.
A signature proves the key was safe. It says nothing about the decision that moved the money. Hive proves the decision.
Nothing here touches your keys, your MPC, or your cold storage. The decision receipt sits above the signature. It never competes with it.
BitGo holds the private keys and signs the transfer. The signature proves the key was never stolen or copied. That part is solid, and Hive does not touch it.
Which model asked, what it read, which rule it passed before it acted, and whether the move was held or released. Signed as it happens, checkable later offline, with no login and no callback.
Move the two sliders. The risk bar reacts, the route changes when risk crosses a line, and a real receipt gets written on the right. That receipt is the whole point: it is signed before the money moves, and anyone can re-check it later.
BitGo keeps custody the whole time. Hive runs beside it and proves the decision. Watch step four.
The money never moves on a decision no one can prove.
BitGo already ships an agentic wallet, and in March 2026 launched an MCP Server so AI tools can work with BitGo in plain language. Both let a model reach toward value. Each reach becomes a signed record before anything moves.
When a risk officer writes an agent policy, each part is marked in the moment it is written, each carrying the route it earns. The record is built while the work happens, not rebuilt afterward.
Hive is a set of primitives, each with one job. All are available today. Connecting them to BitGo would be a scoped build inside your existing custody and wallet workflows. A developer can prove one connection in under an hour. One protected workflow takes one to three engineering days. A production pilot takes one to two weeks, because security review and change control still matter.
None of this asks you to touch the signing layer. You choose how far to spread it.
The next step is to scope one protected BitGo workflow with your agentic wallet engineering team. One question: does the decision receipt slot cleanly onto the agentic wallet path as the evidence layer above the signature? The proof already verifies offline, today, on the standard you already chose.
These receipts add a narrow record of whether a proposed withdrawal fit the authority assigned to it, plus a separate check of the supplied withdrawals against one shared limit. They run in production today. The examples below are verified live against them.
Use this receipt when a wallet agent or operator presents one withdrawal for review. It compares the withdrawal amount, currency, timing, and scope with the constraints in one delegated authority receipt signed before that withdrawal was authorized. The service recomputes the result from those records instead of accepting a claimed result. That gives custody operations, risk, and legal a focused statement about the action and the authority supplied with it. It can sit above the signature and policy engine without changing key control or cold storage.
What it does not do. It does not prove that the delegation was granted, that the agent identity is genuine, that a network authorized or settled the withdrawal, that value was delivered, or that anyone read the displayed terms. It is not payment authorization and carries no cardholder credential; no card network, issuer, or regulator recognises it as authentication data, compelling evidence, or a liability shift; it cannot decide a dispute, limit rights under Regulation E, Regulation Z, or an equivalent rule, assess cumulative spend or velocity, or show that the supplied authority remained unrevoked when the withdrawal was authorized.
Nothing has run yet. Click Run it and the answer below comes back from the verifier, not from this page.
Nothing has run yet. Click Run it and the answer below comes back from the verifier, not from this page.
This receipt brings a supplied set of withdrawal conformance receipts into one review window. It checks that they name the same delegated authority, use one currency, fall inside the stated period, and contain no duplicate. The service recomputes the count and total in minor units, then compares both with the stated cumulative constraint. That helps treasury and policy teams inspect a batch of actions instead of relying on a handwritten total. A failed run makes the excess or invalid set visible before it becomes a loose end for risk or legal.
What it does not do. It cannot know whether every withdrawal was supplied, so a result within the limit describes only the receipts presented and not all spending by the authority holder. It performs no currency conversion, is not payment authorization, creates no card network liability shift, and does not limit rights under Regulation E, Regulation Z, or an equivalent rule.
Nothing has run yet. Click Run it and the answer below comes back from the verifier, not from this page.
Nothing has run yet. Click Run it and the answer below comes back from the verifier, not from this page.
Every run above posts a verified request body from this domain to the open verify route and prints what came back. The example receipts are signed with published example keys, so verify reports key_trust example_registry. That is on purpose. Nothing on this page is a production issuance, a customer record, or an endorsement. Patent Pending.
Each link opens that entry in the canon implementation explorer, where its schema, mint route, open verify route, auth requirement and implementation state are stated. The state shown here is read from the same registry file the explorer renders from, so the two cannot drift apart. Nothing here implies a customer, a deployment or an endorsement.
Search the explorer for BitGo use case